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THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE INDONESIAN ARMY
Part II*
Ruth McVey
The rebellion of 1958 marked a turning point in the development 
of the Indonesian army, for it provided the central military leader­
ship with the means to establish its ascendancy over the officer corps. 
Had there been a compromise in the settlement of the insurrection, 
General Nasution might have continued for some time to inch his way 
toward control, in the manner in which we saw him progress during 
1955-1956,* 1 and the relations between the army center and the power­
ful territorial commanders would have continued for some time to be 
roughtly equal. But the central military command moved with great 
success against the rebel forces, whose failure was apparent within 
six months of their revolt. This victory both eliminated Nasution’s 
principal rivals for army leadership and gave him great military 
prestige,with which he consolidated his personal position and re­
shaped the army's structure.
Of even greater significance for the army’s ultimate role in 
Indonesia, the rebellion--or, to be more exact, the State of Emergency 
proclaimed in April 1957 in response to the regional crisis--allowed 
the military to expand its activities into the economic and political 
spheres. This expansion provided the army leadership with vital 
sources of finance and patronage, strengthening its position over 
the officer corps and enhancing the army's status in the society as 
a whole. The proliferation of the army's functions and of its 
members' contacts with civilian elements that resulted from this 
development increased the chances for extra-military alliances and 
civilian influence over individual officers, but in another and 
ultimately more important sense, it diminished army disunity. The 
military now clearly had elite status within the society. Under the 
Guided Democracy system of 1959-1965, territorialy officers partici­
pated down to the local level in political decision making; with 
civilian forces increasingly at loggerheads and government adminis­
tration declining in efficiency and authority, the military repre­
sentatives assumed an ever more influential role.
Increasingly, the military functioned in a socially conservative 
manner. The direct role assumed by the army in the economy, and 
particularly the control over Dutch-owned enterprises which it assumed 
in late 1957, gave it a stake in the economic status quo and an
* This is the second part of a two-part article. The first part 
appeared in the April 1971 issue.
1. See "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army," 
Part I, Indonesia. No. 11 (April 1971), pp. 157-176.
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appreciation of the problems of management confronted by labor’s 
demands. Its position in territorial government put army officers 
in a close working and social relationship with civilian elites, and 
it also enhanced their professional military tendency to value order 
imposed from above rather than effervescence from below. Moreover, 
Sukarno’s use of the Communist Party to provide a mass backing for 
his efforts to prevent the army’s political advance underlined the 
rivalry between the PKI and the military as the country’s two great 
sources of organized initiative--two structures whose ideological 
differences were strengthened by the tendency for civilian interests 
to seek their patronage and protection. This polarization, in which 
the army assumed the post of the Right, strained the sympathies of 
officers who looked to the revolutionary tradition, and it created 
an acute problem of military loyalty to Sukarno, who was seen as a 
national father-figure by officers who were by no means otherwise 
leftist. At the same time, however, powerful civilian opposition 
to the army enhanced its corporate sense, for in the post-rebellion 
period the army leaders’ principal rivals were without rather than 
within the military, and they could therefore portray the contest 
in terms of preserving mililtary solidarity against civilian sub­
version.
More concretely, army officers who, under Guided Democracy, had 
acquired (or aspired to) posts and perquisites far beyond those they 
could have imagined in the earlier period were concerned to preserve 
the army’s expanded role, and they were correspondingly alarmed at 
the advance of the PKI, which threatened ultimately to put its own 
hierarchy in the favored position which the army now occupied. Nor 
does it seem probable that this concern to preserve existing privileges 
was limited to members of the officer corps. As we shall see, the 
economic decline of Guided Democracy straitened the circumstances of 
the soldiery in spite of the army’s acquisition of new resources. 
Nonetheless, army men had that very important possession--a rela­
tively secure job. They received relatively advantageous allotments 
and housing, and even after retirement they could be far more certain 
than the mass of the population that their voice would be heard.2 They
2. Official retirement ages were 42 for non-commissioned officers,
45 for junior officers (lieutenants and captains), 48 for middle- 
grade officers, and 55 for officers of general rank. Angkatan 
Bersendjata, September 9 , 1968. However, these limits were not 
closely observed, for there was strong resistance to demobiliza­
tion, which usually meant a significant loss of income, prestige, 
and security. This even proved the case with conscripts: a 1958
scheme for rejuvenating the army through the institution of a two- 
year draft was dropped when it proved difficult to demobilize them 
when their time was up. Nusantara, November 10, 1960, statement 
of Brigadier General Saj idiman; and see Pedoman, May 21 , 1958, for 
the conscription plan. Demobilization and the classification and 
organization of veterans had been problems since the end of the 
revolution, the more so since it was generally expected that the 
army would find sources of employment for those who were sent back 
to civilian life. See the statement by Brigadier General Sajidiman 
above, and also Pikiran Rakjat, February 18, 1963, statement of 
Colonel Djohari;~and Berita Yudha, August 14, 1965, statement of 
General Yani.
Because of the danger posed by discontented men with a knowledge 
of weapons, the army was, within its means, generous in the treat­
ment of ex-servicemen; indeed, of 800,000 claimants to veteran
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were, moreover, men who possessed the means of violence in a time 
when order was gradually breaking down. Particularly in the defeated 
rebel areas of the Outer Islands, where the army behaved like a 
force of occupation, soldiers experienced the psychological and 
material satisfactions of mastery; but everywhere common soldiers 
found their status to be greater than that of their civilian equi­
valents, the rakjat of which Guided Democracy spoke so much and for 
which it did so little.
Because of the army leadership’s greater stability after 1958, 
the consolidation of central military authority proceeded more through 
reforms of the army's institutions than through the personal struggles 
for power characteristic of the parliamentary period. Consequently,
I shall turn my discussion of the post-revolutionary military trans­
formation from a chronological approach to a topical consideration of 
the changes in the army's structure and practices that took place in
status only 5,860 went unrecognized (Pikiran Rakjat, March 21,
1963, statement of General Sambas, Minister for Veterans' Affairs), 
although many of these would have been at best intermitten members 
of the revolutionary lasjkar. Aside from the attention paid them 
in recognition of their potential for trouble-making, the veterans 
could express themselves in the early 1950's through the division- 
based solidarity groups and the officers' league (IPRI), as those 
included both active and non-active military men. They also had 
their own veterans' associations, and, reflecting the restiveness 
of the demobilized soldiers, the largest of these was the Communist- 
oriented All-Indonesia Union of Former Armed Fighters (Perbepbsi), 
which was founded in 1951 and claimed 300,000 members in 1957. See 
Dokumentasi Konggres ke-VI Serikat Buruh Kereta Api (Djakarta: 
Pimpinan Pus at SBKA, 19 57) , p^ 5f>. It enjoyed its greatest influ­
ence in the post-1952 period of army weakness, when it pressed for 
the creation of People's Security Troops, composed of its members, 
who would supplement the army's counter-insurgency efforts. For 
the debate see Antara Warta Berita, July 23, August 22, September 4, 
5, 8, and 16, 1953.
Perbepbsi's importance can be assessed from the fact that high 
army officers, including Colonels Nasution and Gatot Subroto, 
attended its executive session of November 1955 in order to present 
their views on veterans' affairs (Pikiran Rakjat, November 15, 1955). 
A year later, however, Nasution's position had improved to the 
point where he could seek to impose a single, army-controlled 
veterans' organization. This was formally instituted in January 
1957 (Harian Rakjat, January 4, 1957), but it did not actually 
succeed in supplanting the independent organizations until the end 
of the decade. Its commandant and chairman was the Minister of 
Veterans' Affairs, and it served less as a veterans' lobby than as 
a supplement to the ministerial organization. In 1960 it joined the 
World Veterans Federation (PIA news bulletin, July 6, I960). In 
addition, the divisional associations that began to develop in the 
late Guided Democracy period, beginning with the 1963 formation of 
the Body for the Fostering of the Siliwangi Corps (BPC Siliwangi), 
attempted to involve veterans and prevent their forming undesirable 
civilian ties (Pikiran Rakjat, June 25, 1963, statement by General 
Ibrahim Adjie). Nonetheless, the veterans appear to have remained a 
politically disaffected group; it was estimated that 80 percent of 
the Central Java veterans sided with the September 30th Movement in 
1965 (Berita Yudha, May 31, 1966, statement of Lieutenant Colonel 
Sumitro, head of the Central Java Veterans' Administration).
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the late 1950's and early 1960's in the fields of leadership, promo­
tion and patronage, training, and organization. In these areas we 
can see the working out of longstanding ideas regarding the kind of 
army Indonesia ought to have as well as more general efforts to en­
hance the authority of the high command. This period saw the first 
substantial decline of some of the major problems of discipline and 
structure inherited from the revolution as well as the emergence of 
questions created by organizational proliferation, technological 
specialization, and social participation that were to affect the 
army's development in the post-Sukarno period.
Reconstituting the Army Leadership
With the defeat of the 1958 rebellion the army's top leadership, 
for the first time in Indonesia's post-revolutionary history, no 
longer consisted of broadly equal rivals quick to band together to 
sabotage the claims of any one of them to power. Gradually, during 
the course of Guided Democracy, General Nasution lost some of his 
claims to primacy, as his apparent inability to resist Sukarno and 
to formulate a successful response to the PKI irritated his anti­
communist supporters, while his tacit opposition to the President 
disturbed officers strongly loyal to that leader. In the period with 
which we are concerned, however--1858 to about 1963--Nasution was 
able to use his stature as the military's unquestioned leader to 
secure a relatively free hand in determining army placement and policy, 
and one of his principal efforts was naturally directed toward pre­
venting the emergence of any rivals. He did not completely succeed 
in this effort, but he did acquire a high command whose members were 
far more congenial, homogeneous, and obedient than the army had 
possessed before. The members of the general staff were clearly his 
subordinates and not his equals, as were the panglima (territorial 
commanders at division level), the ensuring of whose obedience we 
shall consider later.
Nasution's dominance did not mean that his word automatically 
became army policy, especially in matters concerning the military's 
more delicate internal and external relations. Leadership remained 
collegiate in the sense that important matters required the acquiescence 
of the major portion of the panglima and heads of central army insti­
tutions as well as the decision of the general staff; a good deal of 
negotiation took place in order to achieve the necessary unity, and 
often enough the interests and attitudes of the senior generals were 
so diverse as to prevent any firm decision. Nonetheless, there was 
general acknowledgment as to who had the right to make the less criti­
cal decisions on army policy and to gather consensus on the more 
weighty ones. Moreover, the top army leaders strove to increase their 
overall control by making the general staff, rather than broader 
conferences of senior generals, into the acknowledged forum of dis­
cussion on important matters of policy. They did not wholly succeed, 
but the overall result of their endeavor was to produce a military 
hierarchy whose visible decision-making process was much more like 
the textbook image than before.
Nasution's position as leader of the army was greatly enhanced 
by his accession to the post of Minister of Defense in 1959.3 The
3. This took place in July 1959 with the formation of the Kabinet 
Kerdja, the first cabinet following the return to the 1945
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vesting of this ministerial post in military hands did not receive 
much attention amidst the more dramatic events surrounding the 
formal introduction of Guided Democracy, but it was of great 
importance, for it marked the army leadership’s establishment of a 
principle for which it had struggled from the very beginning of the 
revolution and which had hitherto been denied by Indonesia’s 
civilian governments.4 The ministry was not, henceforth, to go out 
of army hands, in which it remained the instrument of the paramount 
military chief.5
In addition to the Ministry of Defense, Nasution occupied the 
office of Supreme War Administrator (Peperti), which was established 
under the State of Emergency which existed from 1957 to 1963. It 
headed an army hierarchy which paralleled civilian territorial admin­
istration down to the local level and which administered the martial 
law under which the country lay.6 It provided a regular means for 
military intervention in civilian affairs at all levels, and particu­
larly in the early years of Guided Democracy, the decisions taken by 
the Supreme War Administration were often more important than the 
deliberations of the cabinet. The acquisition of this office not 
only enhanced Nasution’s personal prestige and political influence 
but, like his possession of the Defense Ministry, it gave him a hold 
on the army outside that provided by his position as Army Chief of 
Staff. This was important for the one great defeat which Nasution 
suffered in his efforts to secure undisputed claim to military leader­
ship was his removal from that post in 1962. This blow to his power 
was struck in the reshuffle of general staff posts that followed the 
death of Deputy Chief of Staff Gatot Subroto. At that time, Nasution 
was promoted to a newly created post, Chief of Staff of the Armed 
Forces; his old office of Army Chief of Staff became that of Commander 
of the Army and was given to his erstwhile Operations deputy, General 
Ahmad Yani.
This transformation, the effect of which was to remove Nasution 
from immediate command of the army and to supply an alternative focus 
for military loyalties, appears to have been arranged by President 
Sukarno, who desired to weaken Nasution’s grip on post-rebellion army 
loyalties, which now formed a threat to his own power. The President 
could not have made this move stick without the army leaders’
Constitution. Initially, Sukarno tried to persuade Nasution to 
give up the post of Army Chief of Staff in return for the cabinet 
position; but Nasution, being well aware that the dual function was 
a vital key to power, refused to go along with this. See Daniel S. 
Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy (Ithaca: Cornell Modern 
Indonesia Project, 1966) , P- 2T9^
4. See ’’The Post-Revolutionary Transformation,” Part I, pp. 136-137.
5. Under the New Order, General Suharto has also held the posts of 
Minister of Defense and Commander of the Armed Forces (in addition 
to the Presidency), though he has relinquished the office of Com­
mander of the Army, See below, pp. 179-180.
6. Normally the head of the war administration was the chief of staff 
of the territorial army command at the appropriate level. For a 
discussion of the powers and effect of the martial law administra­
tion, see Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, pp. 59-74.
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acquiescence, but there were reasons why it was attractive to them 
as well. In reviving the office of Armed Forces Chief of Staff, 
which had been abolished following the October 17, 1952 Affair in 
the interests of promoting inter-service rivalry, it allowed the 
army to reassert its hegemony over the other services, a dominance 
that was becoming increasingly important to possess as the air force 
and navy expanded and grew in confidence with the aid of their new 
foreign equipment. It also reinsured Nasution’s position as Minis­
ter of Defense, which he continued to occupy in his new capacity as 
armed forces head.
As Yani received his post in preference to several more senior 
generals, Sukarno could hope that he might be weak enough in his 
new office to remain dependent on Presidential support. This cal­
culation proved only partially correct, for Yani, who had already 
acquired a considerable military reputation for his direction of 
operations in the regional rebellion, proved sufficiently adept 
at army politics to overcome much of the resentment at his premature 
promotion. In spite of the best efforts of Sukarno and the civilian 
left, he maintained a lively appreciation that he would have less 
room for maneuver if he broke with Nasution than if he maintained 
a position in the middle. Thus, although he assumed a more coopera­
tive public stance than Nasution did vis-a-vis the civilian leader­
ship of Guided Democracy, he remained essentially a leader of the 
army and opposed to SukarnoTs camp.7
Though Nasution and Yani had different ethnic and divisional 
backgrounds8 and possessed separate personal clienteles, their 
military and social outlooks were sufficiently alike for them to 
represent roughly the same style of officer. They belonged to the 
’’metropolitan superculture”9 which developed in Indonesia’s great 
cities towards the end of the colonial period, a mestizo mingling
7. Towards 1965, with the army increasingly on the defensive in 
capital politics, there was growing talk that Nasution would be 
removed to an exalted but powerless post, that he would be re­
placed as Armed Forces Chief of Staff by Yani, and that the latter 
would turn over his old job to a more malleable army commander. 
Nasution’s position was by that time sufficiently weak that he 
probably could have been replaced had Yani agreed to cooperate 
with Sukarno in the effort, but in the ensuing months there was 
little sign that the Commander of the Army had lost his awareness 
that what was done to Nasution now might later also be done to 
him. It was General Suharto, relying on the great prestige he
had won for his role in the October 1965 coup and on the demorali­
zation of his opponents, who succeeded in kicking Nasution up­
stairs ; having used Nasution’s dismissal as Defense Minister by 
Sukarno following the coup as a reason to seize the Presidential 
powers for himself, he then did not restore Nasution but made him 
head of the Temporary People’s Consultative Assembly (MPRS), 
effectively removing him from active military politics.
8. Nasution was of Mandailing Batak origin and a Siliwangi man; Yani 
was Javanese and of the Diponegoro Division.
9. I have taken the concept from Hildred Geertz, ’’Indonesian Cultures 
and Communities,” in McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven: HRAF Press, 
1964) .
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of Western and Indonesian styles of life characteristic of the modern- 
educated, urban elite. Officers from this group were men of high 
education for the Indonesian army, of relatively distinguished birth, 
people who possessed good access to the upper levels of the civilian 
elite. Dutch was often their common language of informal discourse.10 
They were the type of officer who had dominated the central leadership 
of the army in the early postcolonial period;11 most of their post­
revolutionary military experience was in the capital rather than in 
a divisional context, and in staff rather than line duties. Yani's 
accession thus did not greatly alter the style of the army leadership; 
nor did it change the direction of military reform, for, as we shall 
later see, he had a principal hand in shaping this reform even before 
he became army commander.
As Yani's appointment showed, the army's acquisition of the 
Defense Ministry did not mean the final liberation of the military 
from civilian supervision. Sukarno, acting in his capacity as 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and relying on his increasing 
political stature to secure the loyalty of officers, continued to 
exert some of the influence which previously civilian governments had 
wielded on the armed forces. But he was the only civilian element that 
could interfere at the top level. Political parties and interest groups 
might endeavor to infiltrate and manipulate, but they could only affect 
the behavior of individual officers, usually in a local context; they 
were not capable of influencing army policy as a whole. Moreover, 
even at the height of Sukarno's influence, it was not possible for 
him to achieve the measure of control over the military leadership 
which the parliamentary governments had enjoyed a decade before. The 
civilian politicians had made a fatal step in deciding to recall 
Nasution to power in 1955 and to grant him full backing in order to 
prevent regional disintegration, for, when the rebellion was over 
they found themselves faced with a military leadership too strong and 
too deeply entrenched for them to be able to reassert their preroga­
tives. Sukarno found himself engaged instead in a struggle for power 
with the army chiefs, a contest in which he, though nominally domin­
ant, had in fact the weaker hand, for time and the possession of 
force were on their side. They needed only to preserve their unity 
and authority over their troops to succeed, while he needed to attack, 
to divide their forces, and to set them to quarrelling . This was 
no longer so easy to do.
10. For the social connotations of language usage in Indonesia, see 
Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The Languages of Indonesian Politics," 
Indonesia, No. 1 (April 1966), pp. 89-116.
11. It is perhaps not surprising that, of the seven military leaders 
who were targets of the coup group on October 1, 1965, three had 
played major roles in the October 17, 1952 coup attempt. These 
were Generals Nasution, Suprapto, and S. Parman. It should be 
noted, however, that this did not mean that they were faithful 
followers of Nasution on all issues. We have seen earlier that 
Parman, for example, engaged in conflict with Nasution at the 
time of the Zulkifli Lubis Affair in his capacity as IPRI 
secretary.
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Promotions and Patronage
As we have seen in the discussion of the early efforts to impose 
central authority on the post-revolutionary army, the absence of 
adequate means to satisfy the material requirements of officers and 
units was a major factor in internal disaffection. In amending this 
condition on his return to office as Army Chief of Staff in 1955, 
General Nasution turned to an increase in the rate of promotions as 
the most immediately efficacious salve. Nasution had had little luck 
in handling the promotions issue earlier, for it had been his groupfs 
efforts at channeling assignments and promotions that had largely 
been responsible for uniting his military opponents in 1952.l* In 
the three years that had followed his downfall, discontent over ranks 
and placements had festered, and it was apparent that he had to take 
immediate and generous steps if he wished to secure cooperation and 
prevent the further dispersal of the high commands control in the 
direction of civilian and regional interests. At the same time, he 
was comforted by the fact that promotions were easy to make, needing 
only central fiat; and they were relatively cheap--a major considera­
tion for an army leadership which disposed of very few ways of satis­
fying the material demands made on it.
The first major reform which Nasution undertook on his return 
was, therefore, that of bringing order into the arrangements for 
promotions. To give army men a sense of regularity and structure 
in their careers and to bind them to the ideas of discipline and 
objective bureaucratic routine, it was necessary to introduce the 
appearance of impersonal and earned reward into the matter of advance­
ment, for so long as promotion was thought an affair of patronage, 
alliance, and the power play at the top it was not likely that 
officers would abandon a personalistic approach to their pursuit of 
their ambitions. Accordingly, at the beginning of 1956 a commission 
was installed to review army ranks and assignments and to advise the 
Chief of Staff on their revision. It was headed by the Deputy Chief 
of Staff, Colonel Gatot Subroto. That officer had been a Nasution 
ally in both the October 17 and Lubis Affairs, but he commanded 
independent respect both through his own strong claims to army leader­
ship and the contrast between his flamboyant personality and the 
gray bureaucratic image of his chief. In addition, the Commission 
included Nasution1s erstwhile enemy Colonel Bambang Supeno, evidently 
as evidence of Nasution1s intention not to repeat the policies that 
had brought charges of favoritism in 1952. This time, too, the 
Nasution leadership did not repeat the mistake of coupling reorganiza­
tion with the threat of unemployment. Instead, the Gatot Commission's 
deliberations were accompanied by assurances that the army would ex­
pand in size and that, since it appeared that Indonesian ranks were 
lower than those of military men doing equivalent jobs in other 
countries, massive promotions would take place.12 3
12. See nThe Post-Revolutionary Transformation," Part I, pp. 143-148.
13. Madjalah Angkatan Darat, I (January 1956), announcing the forma­
tion of the Gatot Commission. See also Waspada, August 9, 1956, 
for a communique by the Army Information Service on the progress 
of the Commission's work. The Commission consisted at that time
of Colonels Gatot Subroto, Bambang Supeno, Suwondho, and S. Parman. 
It is interesting to note that these officers were all of East 
and Central Java divisional background; there was no Siliwangi or 
Outer Island representation. It was probably reckoned that
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At the same time, the high command stressed that these pleasant 
prospects were tied to sacrifice. It forbade army men and veterans 
henceforth to have associations of their own, for too often, it 
declared, such groups had interfered in military matters and tried to 
establish "shadow hierarchies" in rivalry with the official chain of 
command. Once the Gatot Commission had completed its deliberations 
and a central system of education and training had been established, 
there must be no more regional efforts to establish training units 
and schools or otherwise interfere with central prerogatives in 
placement and instruction. All matters of the officer corps must go 
through the officers' union, the IPRI. Even this organization was 
reminded that it was an unofficial association which might not make 
public pronouncements concerning internal army affairs, but only 
make proposals aimed at improving the army's organization and methods 
of work.  ^ Coming as this proclamation did in a time of regional 
defiance, it was not much more than a declaration of intent; but it 
described an intention firmly held, and the high command applied 
it with an increasingly strong hand in the areas which it controlled.
The Gatot Commission's task of sorting out the multitudinous 
claims of officers after six years of retrenchment, confusion, and 
favoritism was clearly very difficult, but it was aided in its 
efforts both by the policy of rank increase and by the fact that the 
1958 rebellion removed a great many claimants from consideration. 
Moreover, in the 1957-1959 period the army leadership moved rapidly 
from rags to relative riches: The declaration of a State of War and
Siege in early 1957, the seizure of Dutch enterprises later that year, 
the turn from parliamentary rule to Guided Democracy, and the acquisi­
tion of substantial amounts of foreign military aid, all opened new 
vistas for promotion, advantageous assignment, and power. However, 
as the question of promotion and placement was not one that vanished 
with the first major sorting-out, it was decided to make the commis­
sion permanent as the Central Advisory Council on Offices and Ranks.14 5
Nasution's presence as Chief of Staff would ensure attendance to 
Siliwangi interests.
It is not clear why Indonesian ranks were held at a relatively 
low level through the early 1950's. A possible explanation is 
that the general reduction of ranks that accompanied the ration­
alization effort was intended to be succeeded by the selective 
promotion of the type of officers desired by the Nasution-Simatupang 
leadership, but that neither this group nor succeeding leaders 
were strong enough to promote their clients above other claimants. 
The first post-revolutionary general, following Simatupang's 
retirement, was Nasution, who advanced from colonel to major 
general on his return to office in 1955.
14. Waspada, March 8, 1957 (Army Information Service Communique) 
announcing the opinion of the high command. The reference to IPRI 
pronouncements on internal army matters was no doubt related to 
that association's hapless intervention in the Zulkifli Lubis 
Affair (see "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation," Part I,
pp. 172-173).
15. Dewan Pertimbangan Djabatan dan Kepangkatan Pusat. It consisted 
of Gatot Subroto and six other officers. Kedaulatan Rakjat,
October 1, 1958.
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In 1960, in response to the rapidly increasing complexity of the 
officer corps, it was split into the Council on Assignments and Ranks 
for Senior Officers (WANDJABTI) and the Advisory Council on Assign­
ments and Ranks (DEPDJABKA), which dealt with the middle grades. The 
WANDJABTI, known as the Generals' Council, was to play an increasingly 
important role in the 1960's because it gave a say to some of the 
army's most senior and powerful officers who would otherwise have 
been unable to present to the general staff recommendations for pro­
motions and assignments outside their official spheres of responsi­
bility.16
Side by side with the effort to regularize promotions, the high 
command endeavored to secure acceptance of a two-year tour of duty as 
the norm for army assignments. This policy, of course, ran directly 
counter to the territorial commanders' interest in entrenching them­
selves, and indeed it was aimed particularly at destroying their in­
dependence. The principle was necessary for other reasons as well, 
particularly to ensure the smooth flow of promotions and assignments, 
which, after the early 1960's, again showed signs of becoming blocked. 
In the pre-1965 period the high command could never really overcome 
resistance to a standard length of assignment, try as it would, for 
it was still too weak and divided to be able to impose its will on 
senior officers (including its own members) who had no intention of 
losing advantageous positions or weakening their subordinates' sup­
port by the untimely movement of themselves or their favorites. The 
roughly equal age of the officer corps inherited from the revolution 
was incompatible with the highly pyramided hierarchy of posts, and it 
was only after 1965, with the massive post-coup purges of the army 
and the arrival of the revolutionary generation at an age indisput­
ably close to retirement, that this major obstacle to the regulariza­
tion of promotions and assignments was removed.17
Promotion and placement were important for pacifying individual 
officers, but to keep troop commanders loyal to the center and in 
control of their men, the high command had to provide supplies, 
equipment, and amenities on a far greater scale than it had done in 
the early post-revolutionary years. In the late 1950's, the high 
command proceeded to acquire substantial resources of its own, in a 
transfer to control over resources that entailed a major reorganiza­
tion of the Indonesian governmental and economic system.
The first step in the direction of securing greater control over 
patronage sources had already been taken with the reappointment of
16. At the time of the October 1965 coup the chairman of the council 
was General Sudirman, head of the Army Staff and Command School, 
and its vice-chairman was General Suharto, head of the Army 
Strategic Command. The term "Generals' Council" (Dewan Djenderal) 
was used to refer to this group from an early date (see, for 
example, Kedaulatan Rakjat, June 8, 1962).
17. In the post-1965 period the tour-of-duty principle was also ex­
tended to the posts of chief of staff of the various services. 
Suharto declared on the installation of Soewoto Soekendar as 
head of the air force in January 1970 that the government intend­
ed to limit the service chiefs to a three or four-year assignment. 
Merdeka, January 8, 1970, reporting Suharto's speech.
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Nasution as Army Chief of Staff, for, as we have seen, it reflected a 
decision on the part of Sukarno and the Djakarta political leadership 
to subordinate their desire to divide and rule the military to the 
cause of preventing regional rebellion. Consequently, Nasution 
received full governmental backing in his appointment policies and 
in his handling of the Zulkifli Lubis Affair. He also seems to have 
received assurances of considerably greater allocations of funds than 
the army had obtained since the October 17 Affair, and he placed much 
stress on this in soliciting support from within the army. 8 Nasution 
also secured government acquiescence in major arms purchases abroad, 
and at an early date a mission was dispatched to Indonesia’s previous 
suppliers to discover what new arrangements could be made. Unfortun­
ately, the initial enquiries yielded little of promise: Indonesia’s
supply of hard cash was very low, and the major country likely to 
supply arms for credit, the United States, was uncertain of Djakarta’s 
political reliability and more than a little attracted by its regional- 
ist opponents.
With foreign assistance temporarily unavailable and Indonesia’s 
own resources drained by economic decline and smuggling, it is very 
doubtful that the army leadership could have acquired the sort of 
patronage it needed short of a coup that would have placed civilian 
posts and perquisites at military disposal or a radical reorganiza­
tion which would have enlarged the government’s portion in the 
society as a whole. There was, indeed, much talk of an impending 
army takeover during 1957 and 1958, and Nasution hinted that this was 
the alternative if, by one means or another, the military’s require­
ments were not met.18 9
This crisis was resolved by two means: the utilization of Cold
War competition to provide Indonesia with substantial sources of 
foreign backing, and the progressive extension of governmental 
authority over available domestic resources, with the army getting a 
major share of the new public domain. The first of these moves involved 
the decision to seek aid from the Soviet Union as well as from the 
Western sources to which Indonesia had previously looked. This 
decision,in spite of the officially neutralist postiion of the army 
and governmental leaders, was not an easy one for them to take. How­
ever, when they did make the move they found an excellent reception 
on the Soviet side, for the Khrushchev regime, in the ebullient 
beginnings of its effort to win Asian and African friends, was more 
than pleased to acquire the largest Southeast Asian country as a 
potential client. The Americans, for their part, rapidly reversed 
their position once it became evident that Djakarta would win out 
over the regional rebels; and as relations between Indonesian and 
American military representatives had never deteriorated as those between 
the civilian leaderships had done, it was possible to make swift amends. 
For some time, Indonesia was in the pleasant position of being able to 
bid its two great suitors against each other, though in the end it was 
the Soviets who supplied by far the greatest amount of aid through 
their large-scale provision of heavy equipment, particularly modern 
ships and airplanes.
18. See ’’The Post-Revolutionary Transformation,” Part I, p. 152,
ftn. 26; and also Pesat, XV, No. 41 (October 11 , 1958), pp. 5-6 
(Nasution’s Armed Forces Day speech of October 5, 1958).
19. See Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, pp. 182-190.
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This aid provided the Indonesian military with the naval and air 
capability it needed to enforce Djakarta!s authority throughout the 
archipelago, for the central command’s lack of means to move troops 
massively and rapidly from Java had been a major factor in the re­
gional defiance of the 1950Ts. More generally, the acquisition of 
this advanced equipment was a move in the direction of the sophisti­
cated and highly mobile cadre army to which Nasution and his military 
colleagues aspired.20 They could also reckon that regional commanders 
would be impressed by the possibility of acquiring advanced equipment 
and, insofar as they gained access to it, would bind themselves 
further to the center through its heavy logistical requirements. In 
turn, however, the central army leadership found itself bound to its 
foreign suppliers by the advanced nature of its new armament, particu­
larly since the country had virtually none of the industrial base 
and few of the specialized maintenance skills needed to support a 
large, sophisticated armed force.21
Although foreign aid was an important source of central patron­
age for the army, its scope and significance were far inferior to 
those of the domestic political and economic resources made available 
to the high command. The initial promises made by a government ready 
to give the army leadership whatever backing it could in return for 
support in the regional crisis were soon transformed into real power 
through the proclamation in March 1957 of a State of Emergency. This 
meant the introduction of martial law and a hierarchy of ’’war admin­
istrator” offices which, in effect, placed the supervision of civilian 
government in the hands of the military command of that territorial 
level. This not only gave great political power to the army at all 
levels but, because of the war administrators’ influence on licenses, 
permissions, and means of communication, it provided important pos­
sibilities for economic gain as well. The State of Emergency was
20. See ”The Post-Revolutionary Transformation,” Part I, pp. 143-146.
21. Much of the military aid solicited by the Indonesians in connec­
tion with the rebellion arrived instead in time for the Irian 
campaign of 1960-1962, and it played an important role in a re­
organization and upgrading of army combat units which was initiated 
at that time. The Soviets were quite willing to have their arms 
used for the seizure of West Irian, as they proved by providing 
further supplies. But the next major operation, the confrontation 
of Malaysia, was a different affair so far as Indonesia’s foreign 
creditors were concerned. By this time the Soviets and Americans
no longer responded automatically to attempts to play the one against 
the other, and neither of them saw much attraction in financing an 
Indonesian political course that seemed likely to benefit not their 
interests but China’s. The Americans urged economic stabilization 
and the regularization of relations with the West; the Russians 
also looked for Indonesian retrenchment, for it seemed otherwise 
unlikely that their huge loans would be repaid. When Indonesia 
abandoned its economic stabilization effort of 1963 in favor of 
Confrontation and moved significantly closer to China in its stand 
on international issues, the Americans and Russians rapidly lost 
interest in providing substantial military aid. The effects of 
this decrease in aid were soon felt by the Indonesian armed forces, 
for the demands of Confrontation operations and the stringencies 
of a rapidly declining economy rapidly reduced their available 
materiel. By 1965, military leaders were discussing the necessity 
of ’’standing on their own feet” in the matter of maintenance and 
spare parts.
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important for the legitimation which it gave to the massive penetra­
tion of the civilian world by the army in the first years of Guided 
Democracy. No one could challenge the military physically in its 
new role, but the army leadership was still sufficiently unsure of 
its further amibitons and still legalistically minded enough to find 
this provision for its presence a very important one. We can see the 
weight that this was accorded in the fact that the lifting of the 
Emergency in 1963 gave the army a marked if temporary diffidence in 
its intervention in the civilian political world.
During Guided Democracy, the army presence grew steadily in all 
fields. In some areas older ideas of social hierarchy and proper 
government were sufficiently strong to guarantee the dominance of the 
head of the civil administration but more and more local military 
representatives were acknowledged to possess the greatest weight by 
virtue of the physical resources at their command. Indeed, military 
men were increasingly appointed to posts in the civil service, and 
thus both the heads of local military and civil administrations might 
be army men. This began in the areas that had been under the control 
of regionalist rebels and in localities where the Darul Islam revolt 
had destroyed the regular governmental structure, but during the 
1960's it spread until most governorships and a great many other 
civilian administrative posts were in army hands.
This extension of the army role was most valuable as a source of 
patronage. In the first place it gave the high command--which con­
trolled all appointments of army officers to civilian posts--access 
to political and economic power at all levels of the society. In 
the second place, it provided an opportunity for removing officers 
judged too incapable or unreliable for further advancement in the 
mainstream of army promotion. The emoluments of the new posts would, 
it was hoped, preserve the loyalty of the officers concerned, and 
they would represent the interests of the army in the civilian world 
while lacking the military base that would allow them to interfere 
effectively in intra-army politics. In addition, the army extended 
its political activities by sponsoring a series of mass organizations, 
beginning with the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian in 
1958 and continuing through the "functional organizations" of Guided 
Democracy.22 * These organizations, too, had the dual purpose of 
controlling civilians and providing an opportunity for employing un­
wanted members of the armed forces.
But by far the greatest source of patronage to come into the hands 
of the high command in the pre-coup period was the control over enter­
prises seized from the Dutch late in 1957. The takeover occurred in 
the context of the West Irian dispute, but its domestic effect was 
perhaps even more important than its impact on Indonesia's foreign 
affairs. It brought under Indonesian control a critical area of the 
economy which had hitherto remained in foreign hands, and it transferred 
that control to a particular segment of the Indonesian state, its army.
22. For a discussion of the army's efforts at mass organization, see 
Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, pp. 65-67, 223-228;
Herbert Feith, "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in R. McVey, ed., 
Indonesia (New Haven: HRAF Press, 1963), esp. pp. 335-336.
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This was the beginning of a major military presence in the economic 
life of the country, a presence which gave great power to the central 
command and to the army as a whole but which also served to settle 
the social role of the military in a particular fashion--to ensure 
that it became a conservative force.2*
The extension of army activity into the economy meant, among 
other things, that military leaders were provided with substantial 
sources of funding outside the regular government budget, which it­
self expanded the defense allotment greatly.2h The direct tapping 
of the resources of the state enterprises was not simply a matter of 
providing luxuries for well-placed officers, for the Indonesian 
armed forces, though not large in relation to the problems of security 
which the country's geography and social divisions presented, were 
expensive in relation to the funds available to the government. 
Attempts at retrenchment--such as the government's stabilization 
effort of 1963--involved a real sacrifice of military supplies; they 
were felt by army members in the form of reduced rations and benefits, 
and this reduction in turn created a problem of internal military 
instability.24 5 Not surprisingly, the army leaders sought to forestall 
this, by opposing effective reductions of the army's share of govern­
ment funds or by tapping moneys before they reached the government.
This independent system of funding had considerable advantages 
for the central army command. For one thing, it made it even freer 
of civilian control than before. For another, it provided great 
patronage powers, not only because the appointment and removal of 
officers placed in charge of government enterprises or otherwise
23. For a general discussion of the army's role in the takeovers, see 
Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy, pp. 69-70; J. A. C.
Mackie, "Indonesia's Government Estates and Their Masters,"
Pacific Affairs, XXXIV, No. 4 (Winter 1961-62).
24. The high point of military utilization of the government budget 
was in the final stages of the Irian campaign, when about three 
quarters of the budget was devoted to defense. In 1966, the 
armed forces were still consuming 70 percent of the budget, accord­
ing to Colonel Sajidiman Surjohadiprodjo. Of this, he said one 
quarter was used to maintain the organization and the rest for 
operations; even if all operations ceased, the minimum necessary
to keep the military would be 25 or 30 percent. Berita Yudha, May 
30, 1966. The government's subsequent ability to reduce this per­
centage drastically has been aided by the practice of informal 
financing discussed below and by the devotion of sizeable funds 
earmarked for "special projects" to military purposes. The dir­
ect role of the army in enterprise management has been greatly 
reduced, however.
25. Thus in 1963 the Central Java panglima, General Sarbini, urged army 
members to understand the necessity of budget cuts which had meant 
the reduction of that year's standard ration and the discontinua­
tion of refined sugar, butter, and cigarette allowances for soldiers. 
Kedaulatan Rakjat, June 19, 1963, speech to the Jogjakarta garri­
son. No doubts the common soldiers were the first to suffer under 
such cutbacks, but, particularly as inflationary pressures in­
creased, a lack of funds was felt as well in the officer corps.
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inserted into the economy lay in the hands of the high command, but 
also because the informal system of financing created a "slush fund" 
of sizeable proportions which the military leaders could use largely 
as they wished to enhance the army’s and their personal power. How­
ever, the system also contained substantial drawbacks, which made 
themselves most evident in the general decline of the economy and 
which also acted to reduce the power of the army leadership.
The most visible of these disadvantages was the conflict of pur­
pose which arose as a result of the high command’s utilization of 
economic appointments as a means of buying off recalcitrant or incom­
petent officers as well as a means of obtaining funds. Aside from the 
fact that the officer appointed to manage or supervise a government 
enterprise very rarely had any relevant experience, he was also, 
because of this policy, unlikely to be very competent or eager in the 
matter of learning. Especially in the first years of Guided Democracy, 
many army estate supervisors used their position essentially to divest 
the enterprise assigned them of whatever sources of income it possessed, 
with the result that productivity declined disastrously and consider­
able reinvestment was required in order to make the concern at all 
viable again. In the seized export-import concerns, where the 
military supervisors’ lack of experience quickly led to crisis, the 
frequent resolution was that the official administration became a 
front for the actual backroom running of the enterprise by business­
men from the Chinese minority, whose position as Indonesia’s main 
commercial force was enhanced by the removal of the great Dutch firms 
that had hitherto dominated the country’s international trade.26
These developments placed the military in a parasitical role which 
was not conducive to high morale and incorruptibility. The question 
of military corruption first became acute in 1958, as it became 
apparent to the army leaders that their entrance into economic and 
political life was not leading, as they had hoped, to efficiency and 
the ousting of rascals but to the bewilderment and corruption of 
military men faced with many temptations and armed with small sense 
of purpose. The army heads endeavored then and later to combat 
corruption in their forces, but their efforts were foiled by the 
ready possibilities of temptation, the pressures of inflation, and 
the army leaders own visible reliance on extraordinary sources of 
finance.
The army’s direct utilization of the economy as a major source 
of income, and the widespread appointment of army officers as managers 
of already established enterprises gave the military a very consider­
able stake in the existing economic structure. Strikes were banned 
in important enterprises soon after their seizure from the Dutch and 
were not again allowed; military units and civil defense groups under 
army supervision saw to it that labor discipline was preserved and 
that squatters were driven off estate land. This was a principal reason 
why, in spite of the populist rhetoric of Sukarno and the public
26. See Robert Curtis, "Indonesia and Malaysia," New Left Review
(November-December 1964); J. Panglay Kim, "Some Notes on the Ad­
ministrative Aspects of Indonesian State Trading Corporations," 
Maandschrift Economie, 18 (October 1964); Lance Castles, "The Fate 
of tTie Private Entrepreneur,’’ in T. K. Tan, ed., Sukarno’s Guided 
Indonesia (Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1967).
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expansion of the PKI, the position of the Indonesian labor organiza­
tions declined precipitously in terms of being able to launch effec­
tive actions for wages or other improvements in their members' 
standard of living. The sources of social conservatism already pres­
ent in the Indonesian officer corps27 were thus reinforced by a con­
crete and substantial identification with the economic status quo.
Although the army high command claimed the right to appoint army 
managers of enterprises and appointees to political positions, its 
use of these sources of patronage resulted in another sense in the 
weakening of its grip. The expansion of military activity into the 
civilian sphere led to the growth of alliances and entanglements there 
between individual officers and their civilian counterparts. It 
opened up new, local sources of patronage and support; and, because 
the high command itself indulged in highly informal fund raising, 
officers easily felt justified in making arrangements of their own. 
Nor, given the great power which an army officer represented, were 
civilians likely to refuse the chance to obtain the friendship of one 
that was strategically placed; on the contrary, both as individuals 
or representatives of parties and interest groups, civilians made 
considerable efforts to obtain military patrons and to take advantage 
of whatever army factionalism might be bent to their interests. Fin­
ally, the continued stringency of army finances meant that local 
commanders often felt obliged to make informal arrangements for the 
support of their troops; moonlighting and the commercial use of army 
vehicles were common, and local sources of income were tapped by 
officers and men. Thus, a rather sprawling system of army financing 
emerged, partly distributed from the center and partly locally de­
rived or acquired from patrons elsewhere in the military structure.
It was difficult for the army leaders to oversee this development, 
and it acted as a brake bn their efforts to create an obedient and 
efficient military machine.
Education as a Source of Central Control
One of the principal projects which General Nasution promoted 
after his return to power in 1955 was upgrading the army's instruc­
tion and training system and transforming it into a means of en­
hancing the army's ideological unity and hierarchical discipline.
The early moves in this direction, which began about 1956, went 
largely unnoticed amidst the more dramatic events of the Lubis coup 
and the subsequent regional rebellion; but when the dust of these 
conflicts had settled, it was apparent that the new policies were 
already well on the way toward creating a military force of quite 
different character from that of the 1950's.
We might have expected, given the orientation towards expertise 
which we observed in Nasution's earlier leadership of the army, that 
he would place considerable emphasis on instruction and training, but 
recognition of the key role of education did not stem from the ideas 
of his kind of officer alone. It flowed as well from the "red"
27. See "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation," Part I, pp. 133-134.
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tradition28 of the revolution and the earlier experience of the Peta 
during the Japanese occupation, in which military and ideological 
training were seen as equally vital to the creation of the fighting 
man. This consideration indeed continued to be important during 
Nasution’s term of office. In the first place, his emphasis on 
expertise over indoctrination was only relative, for he was of the 
revolutionary generation himself; moreover, the army’s great role in 
civilian affairs in post-parliamentary Indonesia made the military 
leaders feel strongly the need for a doctrine which would provide them 
with a broader national purpose and prevent army members from being 
drawn toward civilian political movements. Consequently, they saw 
education as including not only technical training and the principles 
of soldierly obedience but also the shaping of a broader ideology.
In the end, however, while the technical side of their program flour­
ished, the doctrinal effort did not. It was a victim not of lack of 
emphasis--for it received a great deal of that--but of the army 
leaders1 own puzzlement as to their ultimate political goals and of 
their inability to compete with the ideas put forward by Sukarno 
and other major civilian political forces.
The acute shortage of trained personnel for the revolutionary 
armed forces and the desire to acquire the accoutrements of full 
nationhood inspired Indonesia’s leaders to create a system of military 
instruction soon after the declaration of independence. In October 
1945 a National Military Academy (Akademi Militer Nasional, AMN) was 
formed in Jogjakarta.29 In Malang, an Army School (Sekolah Tentara) 
emerged to provide instruction and upgrading, particularly for the 
forces fighting in East Java. In July 1948 the Malang school was 
formally incorporated into its Jogja counterpart, which continued 
until 1950. At that point the Academy found itself stranded by the 
removal of the capital to Djakarta, the lack of educated young men 
attracted to a peacetime army career, and factional rivalries for 
control over military institutions. Only ten candidates presented 
themselves for admission, and these, given the chance, chose training 
with the Corps of Engineers in Bandung or at the Royal Netherlands 
Military Academy in Breda instead.30 As a result, the AMN was 
ordered to close its doors.
The primary focus of military instruction now shifted to Bandung, 
where the Chandradimuka Academy had been established to provide courses
28. Ibid. , p. 134.
29. The Academy opened on October 28, 1945, with five hundred students; 
in November 1948 it graduated its first class, 196 second lieuten­
ants. Forty-five of the original group were listed as killed in 
action before graduating. The second and last revolutionary class 
was much smaller, some two hundred students. Kedaulatan Rakjat, 
November 21, 1957. According to Benedict Anderson, the Jogjakarta 
academy was preceded by a school set up in Tanggerang by Peta- 
trained officers including Sukanda Bratamenggala and Daan Mogot;
it was dissolved when the Republican forces abandoned Djakarta. 
(Private communication to the author.)
30. Kedaulatan Rakjat, November 21, 1957. Military scholarships to 
Holland were^ offered as part of the Round Table Conference agreement 
and ceased with the 1953 expulsion of the Netherlands Military Mis­
sion; they never became an important source of post-revolutionary 
Indonesian military training or clique formation.
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to upgrade military officers and in particular to create for them a 
common ideological base. Unfortunately for its survival, this insti­
tution was headed by Colonel Bambang Supeno, who, as we will remember, 
fell afoul of the Nasution-Simatupang army leadership.31 In the 
course of the quarrel the high command eliminated the school as a 
source of Supeno!s support by abolishing it.32 Thereafter the Staff 
and Command School (SSKAD, later SESKOAD) was developed as the prime 
center of military instruction and ideological formulation. It drew 
its clientele, for varying periods of assignment, from officers on 
active duty, whom it was supposed to provide with the highest level 
of instruction in the military educational establishment. It did 
not, in other words, do what the National Military Academy was sup­
posed to have done, that is to provide university-level instruction 
for young men who wished to embark on a professional army career. 
Nothing did so for five years: evidently Nasution and his allies
lacked sufficient support to establish an academy to their liking but 
had enough backing after their 1952 fall from power to keep their 
opponents from doing so themselves.33
31. "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation,?f Part I, pp. 145ff. The 
name of the academy fit well with Bambang Supeno’s ideological 
leanings, for Chandradimuka is the name of the boiling crater into 
which the wajang hero Gatotkatja is dipped to make his body like 
steel. I am grateful to Benedict Anderson for pointing this out 
to me.
32. Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press , T962y7~P^ 250 ; Pelopor , May 17, 
1955. The Academy accepted officers from the rank of major up,
and as the highest officer was then colonel, it thus accepted the 
army’s most senior members. Feith emphasized the close identifi­
cation of the Chandradimuka leadership with President Sukarno.
The academy’s ideological endeavors were oriented toward the in­
culcation of the principles of the army oath of loyalty, Sapta 
Marga, which Bambang Supeno had drawn up and which was to continue 
as the army’s fundamental pledge. The instruction was designed to 
contain something for the group of officers of fundamentally revolu 
tionary bent, something for the technocrats, and something for 
those who wished to see the army play a more active role as an 
instrument of state power. Pelopor, May 17, 1955.
33. The Defense Ministry had urged reopening the National Military 
Academy in 1952 but had not been able to push the project far 
before the October 17 Affair. Subsequently army committees and 
commissions studied the problem of reopening the academy, but 
nothing was decided until 1956. The school reopened its doors in 
October 1957. In December 1965 it was renamed Armed Forces Academy 
of the Republic of Indonesia (AKABRI) and given charge over the 
education of cadets from all services. Sapta Marga, December 3, 
1965.
General Nasution noted that candidates for the AMN, who were 
required to have senior high school (SMA) certificates, experi­
enced great difficulty passing the psychological test required 
for entrance: on average, only 23 percent got through. Their
main failings were a low state of general knowledge, insecurity 
and timidity, inability to distinguish real from false problems 
and solutions, lack of judgment and character, and lack of leader­
ship talents. See A. H. Nasution, Menudju Tentara Rakjat (Djakarta
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With no other high-level educational or planning institutions in 
existence, the Staff and Command School emerged as the army's intel­
lectual center; in later years, when challengers did exist, it was 
still able to maintain its primacy as the source of military doctrine 
and thought.31* Moreover, owing to the fact that the officers who 
attended its courses were drawn from all over the country, it afforded 
an opportunity for acquaintances to be made and bonds to be formed 
among officers of varied divisional background. For many officers 
in the 1950's it provided their first chance to meet colleagues out­
side their home territory, and the school tie soon acquired importance, 
especially for young and ambitious officers who saw their schooling 
as a key to appointment in the capital or as a means of pressing 
claims against uneducated superiors at home. The placement of an 
officer who underwent a course at the school was normally made by 
Djakarta; a promising student might well find himself assigned to the 
staff of a difficult panglima from which delicate perch he might, if 
he acted successfully in the interests of the high command, aspire 
to promotion and perhaps the panglimaship itself.
But as we have seen from the SSKAD's part in the Lubis Affair 
of 1956,3 5 the political role of the Staff and Command School (and 
for that matter of any other major military educational institution) 
could work against the central command as well as for it. In cutting 
across regional ties, it also created loyalties of its own, in which 
army headquarters had no necessary share. It could and did foster 
notions of elitism and of collective representation for the officer 
corps, and the school's leaders felt this opinion provided sufficient 
legitimation for political action so that they used it on occasion to 
challenge Djakarta. The army leadership could not feel this threat 
was over once the crisis of the Lubis Affair was past, for it 
recognized that the SSKAD intervention was a reflection of the broader 
problem created by the army leaders' effort to increase central con­
trol over a diffuse and diverse military force. Under such gathering 345
Jajasan Penerbit Minang, 1963), pp. 194-198. The psychological 
test appears to have been as much an I.Q. test as anything else, 
and its results may have reflected in part the declining standards 
of Indonesian secondary school education; in addition, it was 
probably very difficult for students of provincial background to 
respond adequately to what appears to have been a rather westernized 
personality test.
34. The principal one of these was the National Defense Institute 
(Lemhanas), which was established in 1965 as a "think tank" to 
study matters of defense policy in a more thorough manner than 
was possible at the Staff and Command School. Pikiran Rakjat,
July 26, 1963, statement of Major General Sudirman, commander of 
the SESKOAD, concerning plans for the new institution. Its loca­
tion in Djakarta placed it closer to the center of power than the 
Bandung-based SESKOAD and made it easier for military and civilian 
leaders stationed in the capital to participate in its activities, 
but it has remained less important than the SESKOAD as a center
of army thought.
35. See "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation," Part I, pp. 171-172.
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central pressure, army institutions which possessed prestige and which 
brought together officers of widely different background were almost 
bound to become sources of criticism, whether or not this was en­
couraged by those in charge. And yet, if the high command wished to 
possess a militarily qualified and doctrinally unified army, it would 
have to bring officers together and grant prestige to the centers of 
their instruction. The question in the mid-1950fs was whether to put 
aside the development of a central educational and training structure 
for the short run, in the interests of economy and the preservation of 
diffuse opinion--much as the Military Academy had been put aside 
earlier--or whether to grasp the nettle firmly and strive to pass as 
quickly as possible to the stage where the central command possessed 
a reliable and effective instrument for shaping the Indonesian army 
man.
A prime factor in the decision to move massively in the direction 
of developing the educational system was the return of Colonel Ahmad 
Yani from the United States in 1956 and his assumption of the role of 
Deputy in charge of Operations on Nasutionfs staff. Yani had spent a 
year at the American army’s staff and command school at Fort Leaven­
worth, Kansas, and while there he had been greatly impressed by the 
ability of that institution to mold effective and ideologically com­
patible officers in a brief period of time. In the American system 
of military instruction he and his colleagues on the army general 
staff saw a model which was modern without being Dutch, one which, 
moreover, had fashioned the world’s paramount military force, a 
wealthy potential patron with a rising interest in Southeast Asia.
It seemed possible, following the American example, to construct a 
training and instruction system that would expose army men at all 
levels to new ideas, skills, and central control and which would have 
a transforming role in the creation of a unified army. But this 
could not be a matter of half-measures: a great deal of the army’s
resources would have to go into the enterprise, so that the schools 
would impress their attenders instead of adding to their discontent; 
and the officers assigned to teach in them must be of high caliber 
and not, as too often in the past, those without the ability or con­
nections to obtain posts closer to the seat of power.
The immediate ideological goal sought was, with gestures to the 
Indonesian revolutionary heritage, the Western ideal of the profession 
al soldier: a nationalism deemed to be above partisan politics, a
stress on hierarchy and discipline, and a sense of pride at being 
part of a vital and highly trained organization. By intensive indoc­
trination and the development of military skills, it was hoped, army 
men would adopt a more ’’modern" and professional way of looking at 
their role and would cease to be distracted by the anti-hierarchical 
ideals of the revolution, by patron-client ties, and by regional and" 
religious loyalties.3 6 36
36. The Western ideals of professionalism, while overtly nonpartisan, 
do contain powerful incentives for military intervention in pub­
lic affairs, as has been demonstrated by S. E. Finer, The Man on 
Horseback (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 25-32. However, in the 
Indonesian situation, where the army had both a revolutionary 
tradition and an immediate political role, the short-run effect 
was to confuse officers as to the extent of their proper participa 
tion in nonmilitary affairs.
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Before July 1956 army instruction had been the theoretical pre­
rogative of the central inspectorates and offices, which provided 
training in their respective fields of specialization. Much of the 
military's basic education in practice was not supervised from the 
center at all, for territorial commanders wishing to upgrade their 
units and to improve their cohesion and local loyalty had provided 
instruction and indoctrination quite independently. In mid-1956, in 
line with the decision to stress education as an instrument of the 
center, all instruction and training was placed under a single author­
ity, from whose control only the Staff and Command School and the 
about-to-be-revived National Military Academy were exempted.37 This 
move was accompanied by a general upgrading and ideological weeding- 
out of the training institutions' teaching personnel. Greater emphasis 
was now placed on securing politically reliable instructors, in order 
to provide soldiers with the uniform outlook that would ensure their 
loyalty and efficient response to orders.
At first, all teaching was channeled through a general instruction 
center (Pusat Pendidikan), but this extreme concentration soon proved 
impractical and the major corps were given qualified control over 
their own centers of training. For the infantry, a special infantry 
center (Pusat Kesendjataan Infanteri) was placed in charge of both 
actual instruction and of planning the broader development of infantry 
combat capabilities. Logistically and administratively this body was 
directly under the office of the Army Chief of Staff, while operation­
ally (that is, in actually giving instruction) it came under the 
Instruction and Training Command.38 Within each division-level regional 
command, cadre regiments (TResimen Induk) played an equivalent role.
They were in charge of the instruction and training of the infantry 
units in their territories and were linked administratively and 
logistically to the office of the divisional commander and operation­
ally to the Instruction and Training Command. These regiments had 
charge of the infantry cadre school (SKI) which existed in each 
military region, and of the one or more instruction depots (Dodik) 
which offered refresher courses and basic infantry training. The 
idea behind the whole system was that army men would periodically 
undergo instruction, the successful completion of which would be 
the stepping-stone to promotion and favorable reassignment. The 
educational structure was highly pyramided and culminated, for the 
most successful graduates of earlier phases, in courses for field- 
grade officers at the Staff and Command School.
As it existed in theory, this system not only fitted ideas of 
modern military organization and bureaucratic procedure, but it offered 
immediate practical advantages to the army leadership. Education was 
highly valued in postcolonial Indonesia, and while the officer with
37. This body was first called the General Instruction and Training 
Inspectorate (I. Djen. P.L.), but after a few years it assumed the 
title of Instruction and Training Command (KOPLAT).
38. Pikiran Rakjat, January 17, 1963, speech by the commander of the 
Infantry Center. From 1960 to 1962, he declared, the center had 
trained some 5,700 commissioned, noncommissioned, and candidate 
officers and specialists. When in 1962 the office of Army Chief 
of Staff was replaced by that of Commander of the Army, organic 
(administrative and logistical) control of the center was assumed 
by the office of the army commander.
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a revolutionary reputation but few educational qualifications might 
do his best to deny the need for formal learning, he could not feel 
completely comfortable with his lack of it, and therefore could not 
effectively resist the demand to attend a course. Officers called 
to do a training course might suspect their summons was part of an 
effort to remove them from the local scene, but as long as the prin­
ciple of universal retraining had been laid down and the possibility 
existed that successful study would lead to a desirable new assign­
ment, it more often than not made sense for them to cooperate. Once 
an officer was at a central installation, cut off from his divisional 
base and dependent on the high command for his next post, army head­
quarters could shunt him aside with less chance of resistance from 
himself and his associates than if the blow fell at home.39 401 Ultimate­
ly, the army leadership could hope that periodic instruction at 
central training institutions would orient ambitious officers away 
from the cultivation of a local power base and towards the pursuit 
of expertise and the favor of the center--would create, in other 
words, the attitudes essential to firm hierarchical control.
Needless to say, this system did not become actuality overnight. 
There was a good deal of trouble securing reliable and competent 
staff, and even when the army's income had begun to increase there 
were severe material shortages .lf 0 Moreover, once the new program 
was under way it became evident that the highly centralized system 
originally envisioned would have to be greatly modified. The rapid 
upgrading of army units, the expansion of highly specialized services, 
and increasing sophistication of equipment--all worked for a return 
of authority over instruction to the inspectorates, directorates, and 
offices in charge of specialized functions. Moreover, it became 
evident that extreme vertical organization of military institutions 
made for lack of coordination between local units, and at times 
engendered a rivalry between them that hindered the effort to present 
a solid army front in dealing with local civilian affairs.
As a result, another reorganization of the educational system 
took place in mid-1963. This time the Instruction and Training Com­
mand relinquished its control of actual teaching, though it retained 
general supervision and policy-making powers vis-a-vis the training 
institutions.1*1 At the same time, full authority over the cadre
39. See "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation," Part I, pp. 172-173.
40. Thus Colonel Suharto, then commander of the Diponegoro Division, 
announced in 1958 the temporary closing of the region's Infantry 
Cadre School because there was no money to run it. Kedaulatan 
Rakjat, July 12, 1958.
41. These training institutions were divided into three groups: 
Kesendjataan (infantry, cavalry, and field and anti-aircraft 
artillery); Kedinasan (adjutant general's office, finance, trans­
port, physical education, health, psychology, and justice); and 
Korps (military police, quartermaster corps, engineers, signal 
corps, and women's auxiliary). Nearly all the national-level 
training centers were in Java, and a great many of them were in 
West Java. The Bandung area, where the majority were concentrated, 
boasted twenty instruction centers capable of handling fifty to 
sixty thousand noncommissioned and commissioned officers a year. 
Pikiran Rakjat, June 25, 1963, announcement of the Instruction and 
Training Command.
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regiments was returned to the divisional commanders; furthermore, 
these regiments were placed in charge of all army instruction 
provided in their territories at the divisional level and below, thus 
extending their scope considerably beyond their original infantry 
sphere.1** One reason for this appears to have been the great expan­
sion in local-level army activity in the course of Guided Democracy, 
which meant that lower training institutions evolved new courses and 
included non-army members in their activities.1*3
Not all the army’s instruction and training took place in Indonesia 
itself. A significant portion of the officer corps received training 
abroad, most notably in the United States, where over four thousand 
Indonesian officers were trained before 1965.** * Lesser centers for 
overseas instruction were the Philippines, Pakistan, India, and 
Yugoslavia. Very few Indonesian army officers were trained in the 
USSR in spite of that country’s role as Indonesia’s chief arms supplier 
in the 1960’s, although naval and air force personnel went there in 
rather greater quantity to learn to use Soviet-supplied equipment. 
Russia’s absence from the list of Indonesia’s military instructors 
appears to have been due in the first place to the army leadership’s 
fear of the possible ideological consequences of Soviet indoctrina­
tion.1*5 In addition, the Soviets trained Indonesians (and other 
foreigners) in separate courses in order, they claimed, to minimize 
the language problem and provide instruction more suitable to the 
circumstances a tropical army would face; this division had its merits, 
but the Indonesians suspected they were getting second-class instruc­
tion. Even more important, the Soviets neglected, in the Indonesian 4235
42. For an illustration, see Kedaulatan Rakjat, June 30, 1964, which 
provides a description of the competence of the Diponegoro cadre 
regiment.
43. The instruction depots, at least on Java, seem to have handled a
great variety of training projects. The Fifth Instruction Depot 
Battalion in Klaten had, for example, trained the following by 
1964: officers undergoing refresher courses, paramilitary "volun-
teers” for Irian and Malaysia, people doing compulsory military 
training, the ’’Garuda I" battalion which did UN duty in the first 
Suez crisis, a company of Papuans receiving training in connection 
with the Irian campaign, army-sponsored militia (OPR), and civil 
servants required to undergo part-time military training.
Kedaulatan Rakjat, April 28, 1964, statement by Major Sudibjo,
the depot battalion commander.
44. The great majority of these trained after the end of the regional 
rebellion, for between 1952 and mid-1958 only about 250 officers 
had received instruction in the United States. PIA news bulletin, 
May 15, 1958.
45. Interestingly, this stricture did not apply to Yugoslavia. The 
Indonesian military leadership under Nasution had excellent rela­
tions with the Yugoslav regime, which was seen as nonaligned, 
acceptable to respected Western opinion, and opposed by the Indo­
nesian Communists. In the pre-coup period there does not seem to 
have been much alteration in the Indonesian army’s attitude to 
Soviet Communism as a source of disruptive ideas in the light of 
the Sino-Soviet dispute.
170
participants’ opinion, certain of the patronage aspects expected of 
such tours, and so an assignment to study in the USSR was not highly 
valued.
From the viewpoint of the high command, training assignments 
abroad were a most useful form of patronage; there was a very clear 
order of prestige, with a tour at Fort Leavenworth most highly 
valued.1*6 Foreign training was also held to increase the ideological 
self-confidence of officers. Particularly in the Guided Democracy 
period, it removed them from the Sukarno-dominated Indonesian scene 
and showed them that the ideals held up by their own military leaders 
were the international norm. The host countries were, of course, 
interested in winning friends and influencing opinion among the 
foreign students, and particularly the American programs pursued 
these aims effectively. It did not always work, but its general 
result was to temper suspicion of cooperation with the West and to 
reduce the impact of Guided Democracy exhortations.
In spite of their use of foreign examples and training, the 
Indonesian army leaders did not employ a permanent staff of foreign 
advisers to guide them in the construction of a modern military force 
following the removal of the Netherlands Military Mission in 1953.
In this respect, Indonesia’s experience was quite unlike that of most 
postcolonial states. Nonetheless, an effective military machine was 
created, and if the process was accompanied by many expensive mis­
takes it resulted in an army that was probably more capable of 
handling the situation at home than it would have been had its 
evolution been guided by outsiders. Moreover, consciousness that the 
army was shaping its own character counted a great deal for its inter­
nal morale and the prestige of its leaders.
This self-consciousness was not translated into a clear sense of 
the army’s larger purpose, however. There was emphasis enough on 
indoctrination and ideology, for Indonesian military leaders of the 
Generation of ’45 were too conscious of the importance of these ele­
ments in their own experience to neglect them after the revolution. 46
46. An attempt was made in 1958 to standardize Indonesian levels of 
military training with the educational opportunities available 
abroad: The AMN in Magelang was, according to this plan, to con­
form to the standard of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy; 
the advanced officer course was to be equated with the company 
grade and basic officer training in the US and with the junior 
officer course in India; the second level advanced officer course 
was to conform to the US advanced officer courses and the Indian 
senior officer course. The second grade of the SSKAD was to meet 
the standard of the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leaven­
worth, the Higher War College in the Netherlands, and the Defense 
Services Staff College in Pakistan. Kedaulatan Rakjat, April 26, 
1958, statement by General Nasution.
The normal progress of a Military Academy graduate in the 
infantry was supposed, to be via training periods at the Basic 
Infantry Development School (Sarbangif), the first and second 
Intermediate Officers’ Course and the Advanced Course (all held 
at the Infantry Instruction Center in Tjimahi) to instruction as 
a middle-rank or senior officer in the Staff and Command School.
This progression was not always adhered to in practice, however.
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Moreover, Indonesia's later circumstances emphasized the importance 
of possessing a coherent world view--first the confusion and demorali­
zation of the parliamentary years and then the intense ideologizing 
of Guided Democracy. But the army's leaders found it hard to recon­
cile Western ideas of professionalism with a larger social role; they 
found it impossible to resist Sukarno's ideological presence; and 
above all they possessed no sure vision of Indonesia's goals them­
selves. They continued to think of themselves and the army as revolu­
tionary in spite of the military's increasingly conservative social 
role. They saw the great hold of Sukarno's ideas on their own forces 
as well as on the civilians, and they saw the Communists' ability to 
maintain discipline and mobilize popular support in the face of ad­
versity. They feared and envied these rivals, for though they knew 
they possessed the ultimate physical power, they could not--before 
October 1965--see how this could be employed in a way which even a 
substantial part of their own forces would hold to be legitimate.
As a result, the military's indoctrination efforts had a curiously 
hollow character, a circling about a center that was not there. They 
appeared as a search for a formula that would somehow provide a single 
social meaning for the disparate traditions, experiences, and inter­
ests that went into the Indonesian army's being. Nasution argued that 
the army should pursue a "middle way," neither accepting direct leader­
ship of and responsibility for the country's course nor yet abandoning 
its claims to participate in political and economic life,1*7 but though 
this allowed the army to act in its interests without being bound 
by formal government responsibility, it did not provide the clarity 
of purpose essential to give meaning to the army's broader role.
This meaning had to be total and dynamic, the first in order to seal 
soldiers off from unwanted outside influence and the second to provide 
a vision through which the army could engage the society as a whole.
The line was never found, and the army's doctrine was always in the 
process of coming into being, its formulation debated in the SESKOAD, 
discussed in commissions, and weighed in seminars.
Reorganizing the Army Structure
We have .already noted that Djakarta's victory in the regional 
rebellion eliminated Nasution's most prestigious rivals among the 
panglima and allowed him to emerge as the army's acknowledged head.
But this was not enough to secure the continued dominance of the army 
center over the territorial commanders, whose strong local roots could 
supply a new threat should Nasution's prestige begin to fade. The 47
47. This formulation was developed by Nasution in defining the army's 
role in the emergent Guided Democracy system; he declared that the 
Indonesian army should neither be a political football like those 
of Latin America nor yet a dead instrument like those of Western 
Europe. See his address to the first anniversary celebration of 
the National Military Academy, in Pos Indonesia, November 13-14, 
1958. For a general discussion of the army's political behavior 
in that period, see Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy; 
and Lev, "The Political Role of the Army in Indonesia,*' Pacific 
Affairs, XXXVI, No. 4 (Winter 1963-64), pp. 349-364.
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army leadership therefore endeavored to ensure its continuing authority 
by three major changes in the armyTs structure and distribution of 
power--garrisoning the Outer Islands with forces from Java, reducing 
the authority of the regional military commanders, and creating a 
strike force under direct central control. These moves did indeed 
limit the panglima!s autonomy, but they also created other pressures 
and sources of challenge which were eventually to prove fatal to the 
Nasution leadership.
The armyfs most public response to the defeat of its regionalist 
opponents, aside from the relatively mild reprisals taken against 
those who participated on the rebel side, was its transfer of large 
numbers of officers and men from the three Java divisions to the 
Outer Islands. In effect, the areas outside Java came under military 
occupation by the central island’s forces. The Outer Islands were 
parcelled among the Siliwangi, Diponegoro, and Brawidjaja divisions; 
in these dependencies, they supplied the panglima, most of the key 
officers, and a good proportion of the combat troops. The army leader­
ship reckoned that the infusion of Java forces would prevent the 
identification of military units outside Java with local civilian 
interests, and that in an emergency the Java troops could be relied 
upon to side with their home island.
The military leaders1 calculation was almost certainly correct, 
but there were also considerations which helped to limit the extent 
to which the forces from Java identified with the center and against 
their new environment. Economic interests and a desire to preserve 
their freedom of action against Djakarta impelled officers who came 
from Java to make arrangements with regional civilian elites in spite 
of their initial lack of local ties. Locally popular parties and 
political leaders were often unable to act after the rebellion, and 
in any case they were allowed little influence by the occupying 
military authorities. Local pressure groups in the post-rebellion Outer 
Outer Islands therefore tended to seek the backing of officers as 
much as that of civilian political leaders, with the result that 
civil and military factionalism often became intertwined.
A second method by which the army leaders sought to reduce 
regional power vis-a-vis the center was greatly to increase the 
number of the regional commands, a move which satisfied localist 
demands and created new positions for patronage as well. From an 
initial seven military territories, the number of divisional-level 
regions was raised to seventeen/8 The number of Java panglima was 
not increased (except involuntarily, by the creation of the Djaya 
Division in Djakarta), but their relative strength in army councils 48
48. These are: I, Iskandarmuda (Atjeh); II, Bukit Barisan (North
Sumatra); III, 17 Agustus (West Sumatra); IV, Sriwidjaja (South 
Sumatra); V, Djaya (Djakarta); VI, Siliwangi (West Java); VII, 
Diponegoro (Central Java); VIII, Brawidjaja (East Java); IX, 
Mulawarman (East Kalimantan); X, Lambung Mangkurat (South 
Kalimantan): XI, Tambun Bungai (Central Kalimantan); XII, Tandjung- 
pura (West Kalimantan); XIII, Merdeka (North and Central Sulawesi); 
XIV, Hasanuddin (South and Southeast Sulawesi); XV, Pattimura 
(Maluku); XVI, Udayana (Lesser Sundas); XVII, Tjendrawasih 
(West Irian).
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was improved rather than diminished, for as the older, better manned 
and equipped, more stable, and more prestigious divisions, they had 
the weightiest voice; moreover, the fact that most of the Outer 
Island commanders were alumni of one or the other of the Java 
divisions extended Java's influence to other commands as well.
Another structural alteration undertaken by the central command 
in order to increase its power was the establishment of Inter-Regional 
Commands (KOANDA), which were introduced at the time of divisional 
expansion in order to link the several regional commands of Sumatra, 
Kalimantan, and East Indonesia.119 At first these were little more 
than liaison offices between the territorial panglima and the center. 
However, both the Mandala and Mandala Siaga operations--the Irian 
and Malaysia campaigns--were used to strengthen them, as they were 
to secure other structural changes desired by the center. Instead 
of the army leadership establishing a separate chain of command 
for these campaigns or working directly with the panglima, the 
KOANDA commanders were placed in charge in their respective areas.
This gave a KOANDA head operational claims over a good portion of the 
best troops located in his territory, with the result that his posi­
tion vis-a-vis his panglima was greatly strengthened. They were also 
granted the title of Deputy to the Army Chief of Staff (later Com­
mander) , which enhanced their status and emphasized their roles as 
representatives of the center.
In theory, it was possible for a KOANDA commander to establish 
himself as a sort of super-panglima challenging the central command.
In practice, however, he had little possibility for doing this.49 50 
Insofar as a KOANDA commander could succeed in establishing his 
paramount authority over an entire island he could achieve an appre­
ciable independence of the center, but regional rivalries within 
any one KOANDA grouping were so great, and the existing divisional 
bonds so strong that Djakarta could reckon on being able to check 
unacceptable aggrandizement with the cooperation of the regional 
commands. The KOANDA commander, therefore, could act as a counter­
weight to the panglima without being easily able to play the same 
role against the center.
49. It was not considered necessary to establish this new level of 
command in Java, possibly because it was thought it would be un­
wise to unite the four Java commands in this fashion. However, 
under the Suharto reorganization of 1969, this was done with the 
creation of a KOWILHAN with jurisdiction over the central island 
(see below). It is possible that the development of cooperation 
among the Java commanders in the form of the Panglima se-Djawa 
faction, which had expressed itself strongly in favor of a more 
radical New Order stance in 1967 (see Nusantara, July 10, 1967, 
for its Jogja declaration of principles"^, Suharto concluded that 
it would be better after all to establish an office that would 
serve as' a counterweight to the Java commanders.
50. The nearest approach to it appears to have been the aggrandizement 
of General Mokoginta, whose accumulation of power against the 
local panglima seems to have been one of the irritants leading to 
support for the September 30th Movement in that area, and whose 
subsequent assertions of autonomy led to his removal by Suharto.
The final major structural change which was begun by the pre­
coup army leadership centered about the creation of a strike force 
that was under its direct control. As we have seen, one of the 
major problems faced by the army high command, which was reflected 
in its inability to deal with the regional coups in the October 17 
Affair and in its later difficulties with recalcitrant panglima, 
was the lack of direct control over troops who would he moved quickly 
into an area of resistance. Expeditionary forces were sent to quell 
disturbances outside Java, and troops were transferred across divi­
sional boundaries on the central island to deal with security problems 
beyond the control of local forces; but these troops consisted of 
soldiers from the Java divisions, whose participation had to be 
procured by negotiation with the territorial commanders. The 
panglima were not often eager to commit their forces to actions whose 
outcome was uncertain; moreover, the use of troops particularly identi 
fied with Java was bound to rouse Outer Island tempers more rapidly 
than those which represented the center alone. At an early date, 
therefore, the high command sought to obtain a substantial force 
under its own direction.
The first step towards this was the creation of the Army Para- 
commando Regiment (RPKAD). This force had originated as an elite 
unit within the Siliwangi Division, where it was founded as the 
Third Territorial Commando Force by Colonel Alex Kawilarang in 1952.51 
When, soon after, it came under central control, it dropped all 
formal regional identification, though during the 1950's its per­
sonnel continued to be drawn largely from the Siliwangi Division 
and it retained its headquarters in Bandung. These continuing local 
ties, plus the often-observed inclination of elite units to engage 
in acts of national salvation, seems to have impelled its participa­
tion in the Zulkifli Lubis Affair, in which, as we will remember, its 
officers and men played vigorous if sometimes diverging roles.52
If the RPKAD was not a perfect instrument of the center, it was 
nonetheless effective, after the purge of its members that followed 
the Lubis affair, in providing a show of central force in the regions. 
In situations where officers were eager to expand their independence 
but not to engage in armed conflict, the timely addition of even a 
small number of troops greatly added to the arguments extended by 
deputations from the high command. During the regional rebellion 
itself, RPKAD units reinforced Pakanbaru and went into Riau, estab­
lished beachheads for larger forces in Bukittinggi, Menado, and 
Minahasa, and lent support to the local authorities in Ambon to pre­
vent the outbreak of a rebellion brewing there. By and large, however 
the RPKAD remained fairly obscure during the 1950's, carrying out the 
specialized smallscale operations fitted to the then still very minor 
capabilities of the army for mounting airborne actions.
There were other elite units attached to the principal divisional 
commands which passed, if less completely, under central control.
These were Ranger-trained ("Green Beret") battalions which formed 
the top combat units in their respective regions and which came under 
Djakarta's jurisdiction in the early 1960's. The oldest of them were
51. Berita Yudha, May 15, 1965, provides a history of the RPKAD.
52. See "The Post-Revolutionary Transformation," Part T, pp. 168-170.
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the Banteng Raiders of the Diponegoro Division, which originated as 
a tactical reserve of the Gerakan Banteng Nasional (GBN) command set 
up at the end of 1949 to combat the Darul Islam insurgents in Central 
Java. Efforts to form units which would be able to act swiftly and 
flexibly against the guerrillas were begun in 1951, but it was only 
when the command came under Ahmad Yani's leadership in 1953 that 
two companies of Raiders were actually set up.53 54 They were shortly 
expanded into two Ranger-qualified battalions, both of them stationed 
in the area outside Semarang. In*the Siliwangi Division, the removal 
of its commando unit to become the RPKAD meant the creation of other 
elite groups; two Raiders-type "Kudjang" battalions were formed 
during the 1950's, and these saw extensive service against the Darul 
Islam and in the North Sumatra action which constituted the main 
effort of the Siliwangi Division against the regional revolt.51f 
Raiders units were not formed in the Brawidjaja Division until the 
early 1960's, and then it was evidently only to create East Java 
components for the emergent*Army General Reserve system.55
The incorporation of these units by the center took place as 
part of a general restructuring of the army, the implementation of 
which was begun in 1961. Prior to that year, divisions had consisted 
of battalions and, above them, regiments which were identified with 
a particular territorial responsibility. Now, however, a distinction 
was made between battalions that were to be used principally for 
garrison duty and local defense and those which would serve as mobile 
units used both within and outside the divisional boundaries. The 
former territorial units were to be grouped under Military Area 
Commands (Korem) and, below them, Military District Commands (Kodim), 
the latter normally being the province of one territorial battalion. 
The units designated as field battalions were gathered into brigades, 
day-to-day authority over which rested with divisional headquarters. 
When the brigades were called on duty beyond divisional boundaries, 
operational authority passed to a centrally-established command.56 
Under normal conditions, these brigades consisted of three battalions 
plus auxiliary units; they had no logistical or administrative sup­
port of their own but depended for this on the territorial defense 
system, to which they were usually linked through a territorial 
battalion stationed at the same locality as brigade headquarters.
Though the brigades thus had substantial ties to the regions of 
their origin, they were also given strong reason to feel a qualitative 
difference between their own status and that of the territorial units 
and to value particularly their relationship with the center. They 
contained the better combat units; normally, field battalions and 
not territorial ones had the chance for Ranger qualification or 
absorption into the RPKAD and other elite forces. They were very 
conscious of this enhanced status, and the members of territorial
53. Pikiran Rakjat, November 13-15, 1965; and see Madjalah Angkatan 
Darat, No. 3 (March 1955); No. 7/8 (August 19 56) .
54. Waspada, April 7 and 16, 1959; Pikiran Rakjat, August 19, 1960.
55. Kedaulatan Rakjat, April 26 and December 6, 1963.
56. Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 27, 1961, explanation of the reorgani- 
zation by General Sarbini.
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units were jealous of it;57 they were also quite well aware that 
advancement as elite forces meant greater association with the 
center. Accordingly, brigade officers wishing to be transferred to 
a more desirable post or hoping for the upgrading of their units 
would look to the center rather than to their divisional associations. 
The whole system appears to have been a step towards the realization 
of Nasution's vision of a defense force divided into territorial units 
with strong local roots and a highly mobile strike force; its net 
effect on center-region relationships was to diffuse the power of the 
panglima by introducing two hierarchies into their commands, one of 
which was rather ambiguously tied to their authority. At the same 
time, it took a small but significant step toward psychologically 
orienting an important part of the better infantry units toward 
the center.
Three of the new brigades were still more definitely associated 
with Djakarta. These were attached operationally to a new institu­
tion, the Army General Reserve (TJADUAD), which was created in August 
1961. Their component battalions were not necessarily identified 
with any one division--in fact, they were deliberately formed of one 
battalion from each of the Java regional commands. In normal day-to- 
day activities these components were responsible to the division in 
whose territory they were based (not through any divisional brigade 
or Korem but directly to divisional headquarters), while the TJADUAD 
had prior claim on their services whenever it found it necessary to 
call them up. Into this new category of reserve battalions went the 
best-qualified units, the Raiders from Central and East Java and the 
Kudjang battalions from the Siliwangi Division. In addition the 
RPKAD was placed under the authority of the TJADUAD.
The commander of the TJADUAD was Major General Suharto, who 
held the position from its inception. Suharto also headed the Mandala 
Command, which had operational control over the Irian campaign. This 
provided the first combat experience for the Reserve units in their 
new association, and it was very important for inculcating in them 
a consciousness of new loyalties--to each other, to Suharto as their 
commander, and to Djakarta as the center of the ambitions. The high 
heat of the political campaign for Irian, the massive preparations 
for the invasion of the island, and the dropping of RPKAD and Airborne 
(mostly Brigade III) troops into Dutch-occupied territory-- all served 
to create a sense of identity and common experience greater than one 
might expect from the lack of actual major battle. In the course of 
the campaign Suharto firmly established his image as a key combat 
commander, and he subsequently worked to preserve his stature among 
his men by personal attention to their welfare.58
57. Thus, when Lieutenant Colonel Witono witnessed the disbanding of 
a number of battalions in his command in 1963 he found it neces­
sary to stress that those soldiers who had been reassigned to 
territorial units should not feel themselves thought inferior to 
colleagues who had been posted to field battalions. Pikiran 
Rakjat, February 11, 1963.
58. Suharto was head of the Trikora (Irian campaign) Orphans' Fund, 
and seems to have made various efforts at fundraising and visit­
ing the units which had fought in Irian (see, for example, Nasional, 
May 22, 1963; Kedaulatan Rakjat, January 30, 1964; Pikiran Rakjat, 
September 23, 1964). If other central army leaders made similar 
efforts I have not seen it reported.
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General Suharto also became head of the Army Air Defense Command 
(Kohanudad) at the time he was appointed commander of the TJADUAD,59 
and both his own enthusiasm for air activities and the importance 
of Indonesia's new airborne capability led him to take a particular 
interest in the development of an airborne central strike force. The 
armed forces in general and the army in particular, he argued, must 
become "Para-minded."60 It was the ambition of Suharto and other 
air-minded army leaders to create an Airborne division for the army, 
but at the time the Mandala Command began military operations in 
January 1962 only the RPKAD and Infantry Brigade III were so 
qualified.61 Soon, however, more units were added and various Airborne 
units were promoted into the RPKAD, which during the early 1960's ex­
panded from a small and highly specialized group into an impotant 
force; some were also taken up into the Tjakrabirawa (Presidential 
Guard) regiment, which was formed in 1963.62 A great deal of public 
fuss was made over the elite units, which were seen as a symbol of 
Indonesia's arrival as a world power. Their accomplishments in the 
Irian campaign were celebrated, and their strength and derring-do 
were demonstrated on public occasions. All this, together with their 
special training, superior equipment, and privileges, helped to create 
in these units a sense of separateness from the army rank and file.
In developing a powerful central strike force, the army leaders 
greatly reduced the territorial commanders' ability to resist them, 
but at the same time they created a potential source of challenge 
at the center. The force which in 1965-1966 served General Suharto 
as a vehicle to power, replacing President Sukarno in political and 
General Nasution in military leadership, was the Army Strategic 
Command (KOSTRAD), successor to the TJADUAD. The KOSTRAD, formed 
following the dissolution of the Mandala Command in May 1963, initially 
had jurisdiction over the RPKAD and the first three infantry brigades 
which it had inherited from the TJADUAD. However, unlike the regular 
army divisions, the KOSTRAD underwent no period of temporary retrench­
ment following the end of the Irian campaign; instead, it expanded 
very rapidly, adding cavalry and artillery brigades, upgrading its 
infantry components, and strengthening the RPKAD. In the quarrel 
with Malaysia, General Suharto headed the army component of the 
Mandala Siaga (Confrontation) Command, and this gave the KOSTRAD units
59. Kedaulatan Rakjat, October 5, 1961.
60. Pikiran Rak jat, September 22 , 1964. Suharto learned to jump him- 
self and was awarded paratrooper's wings by the air force.
Pikiran Rakjat, September 28, 1964.
61. In June 1966, the KOSTRAD achieved the long-sought goal of an 
Airborne division (LINUD) system. Berita Yudha, June 18, 1966.
In spite of the many difficulties budgetary deficiencies and lack 
of sufficient expertise caused this body, the achievement of the 
LINUD was important as a demonstration that Indonesia was continu­
ing to aim at acquiring as sophisticated a strike force as it 
could.
62. Airborne units were trained at the Army Paracommando School 
(SEPARKOAD), which indoctrinated them with the ideals of the RPKAD-- 
a sort of air-age version of the traditional bravo. They also 
worked closely with the air force paratroop force, PGT. After
the October 1965 coup the training of all three groups of air- 
qualified troops--Airborne, RPKAD, and PGT--was placed under one 
institution, the Joint Airborne Instruction Command (KOGABDIK 
PARA). Berita Yudha, February 9, 1966.
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a further opportunity for common experience and the strengthening 
of central ties. It also provided Suharto with new possibilties 
to display himself as a leading commander and to solicit the affec­
tion of his men. By the time of the October 1965 coup Suharto had 
headed the same key force for four years and was the only commander 
it had ever had. Furthermore, since 1963 he had been the most senior 
officer on active military duty after the Commander of the Army, and, 
following the practice of the Indonesian army, he therefore replaced 
Yani whenever the latter was absent.63 64 He thus had very powerful 
claims to succeed Yani as army commander at the time of the coup, 
but his very qualifications endeared him the less to Sukarno, who 
needed a pliable man in the job.6*
* * * * * * * * * *
In the development of the army after 1956 we see a tendency 
toward greater centralization and at the same time a proliferation 
of function--both in the sense of greater military specialization 
and of expansion into the civilian sphere--that created new problems 
of control. The problem of containing the panglima was gradually 
reduced, but new rivalries appeared at the center, resulting eventual­
ly in the overthrow of the old army leadership and the establishment 
of one with a quite different style. But many of the same basic 
assumptions regarding the role of the military in society, the 
need for a highly sophisticated armed force, and the importance of 
enhancing central control remained. By the late 1960's General
63. Pikiran Rakjat, June 6, 1963 and July 10, 1964; Kedaulatan Rakjat, 
January 8 j and June 23, 1964, "Speech by Major-General Suharto
on October 15, 1965, to Central and Regional Leaders of the Na­
tional Front," p. 161. Suharto achieved this position in April 
1963, when Lieutenant General Hidajat became Minister of Communi­
cations .
64. This was probably the reason why Sukarno refused to appoint 
Suharto to the command of the army on the death of Yani in the 
October 1965 coup, arguing that Suharto was "too stubborn" and 
instead attempted to name the more sympathetic General Pranoto.
Suharto, having used the KOSTRAD as his own vehicle to power, 
was naturally concerned to prevent its similar utilization by any­
one else thereafter, and he devoted some thought to providing it 
with commanders dependent on his good will and to preventing them 
from becoming entrenched. But the KOSTRAD's developing activities 
also made for a weakening of its effectiveness as an instrument 
of power. Its very rapid post-coup expansion reduced its coher­
ence; moreover, the great power which it enjoyed in the first 
flush of the New Order led both officers and men to assert them­
selves in the civilian sphere. The KOSTRAD as a whole, in fact, 
began to branch out into side activities, providing funds, 
licensing opportunities, protection, and so on for a considerable 
range of enterprises. Because the KOSTRAD possessed power, 
wealth sought it out; but with this came all kinds of attachments, 
interests, and rivalries which have probably weakened its ability 
for concerted military action on behalf of a commander.
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Suharto was in a much better position to wield power than General 
Nasution had ever been, for the army's main civilian opponents had 
been destroyed and the intra-military opposition to him had been 
thrown into disarray by a series of purges. At the same time, the 
greatly increased role of the military in the country's affairs, and 
particularly the demands on its leader, who also held the office of 
President, made it urgent to make the command structure as efficient 
as possible and also to limit the opportunities for rival claimants 
to power to find bases within it. The result was the 1969 reorganiza­
tion of the armed forces. Because the changes made at that time both 
carry forward the main lines of development we have discussed with 
regard to the 1956-1963 period and illustrate how different the army 
has become from what it was in its early post-revolutionary days, 
we might, by way of conclusion, consider briefly the reorganization.
In terms of power, the 1969 reorganization downgraded the top 
echelons of the army as well as the other services and greatly en­
hanced the powers of the Minister for Defense and Security and the 
Commander of the Armed Forces, which offices were held by Suharto.65 
Whereas previously the commanders of the individual services had 
had operational charge over them, this authority was now placed, down 
to company level, in the hands of the Commander of the Armed Forces. 
Hitherto the service commanders had had ministerial rank, but this 
was now taken from them, and, as befitted their loss of actual com­
mand functions, they now assumed the title of service chief of staff. 
The size and competence of the staffs over which they presided were 
reduced, and the powers they lost were transferred to the Ministry 
of Defense and the Armed Forces General Staff. Coordination of the 
services was extended below the general staff level by the replacement 
of the KOANDA, together with their naval and air force counterparts, 
with the Regional Defense Command (KOWILHAN) system. This created 
six regional commands, presided over by members of the three major 
services, who were responsible to the armed forces commander and 
the Ministry of Defense and not to their own service heads.66
Because Suharto was himself clearly too busy with affairs of 
state to devote as much time to the supervision of military operations 
as his new powers required, the post of Deputy Commander of the Armed 
Forces was created, and day-to-day charge of operations was handed 
over to him. The deputy commander at the same time headed the 
Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (KOPKAMTIB) which 
had been set up in the wake of the 1965 coup and was a major instru­
ment for controlling the civilian population. Here again, transfer 
of operational control occurred: day-to-day command rested with the
Deputy Commander of the KOPKAMTIB. This arrangement reflects a main 
theme of the entire reorganization, the desire to achieve maximum 
concentration of power and yet to provide checks and balances against 
the independent use of this strength by any of Suharto's high sub­
65. For details of this reorganization, see "Current Data on the Indo­
nesian Military Elite after the Reorganization of 1969-1970," 
Indonesia, No. 10 (October 1970), pp. 195-208. Note especially 
the official motivation quoted in the introduction (p. 195), 
which makes it clear the purpose was to eliminate any likely 
source of a coup.
66. These were I, Sumatra; II, Java and Madura; III, Kalimantan;
IV, Sulawesi; V, Lesser Sundas; VI, Maluku and West Irian.
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ordinates. General Staff control was extended into the territorial 
defense system by composing the KOWILHAN staffs, of more than one ser­
vice and counterposing their members to their service headquarters 
above and the single-service regional commands below. There has also 
been a diminishing of divisional ties and even of corps affiliation 
for the panglima, for in some of the Outer Island territories officers 
from the cavalry and artillery have been appointed to regional com­
mand.
The 1969 reorganization made the position of Commander of the 
Armed Forces far stronger than any Indonesian military office had 
been before. Simatupang, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in 
the early 1950's, had been responsible to the Minister of Defense 
(which Suharto now embodies in himself). Furthermore, Simatupang's 
formal function had been to preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(GKS), who were supposed to provide the major military decision-making 
center, even if the army had dominated iri fact. Nasution had com­
bined the functions of Defense Minister and Armed Forces Chief of 
Staff, but his authority was limited by Sukarno as Supreme Commander 
of the Armed Forces, who used this role to promote the fortunes of 
Nasution's rivals both within the army and among the other services. 
Under the 1969 reform, the chiefs of staff of the individual armed 
forces appear to have been given no joint role in theory or practice, 
and their individual powers were much diminished with the withdrawal 
of operational command over their services.
Most notably, the 1969 reorganization greatly diminished the 
preeminence of the army, for at the higher levels of command it now 
appeared as only one of three major services. That Suharto, an army 
man, chose to diminish that service's stature once his position as 
national leader was secure seems to flow from the fact that he is 
no longer in a position to control it closely, and he must therefore 
prevent its being too potent a weapon in the hands of another. This 
was not a path to domination which Nasution could have followed as 
Armed Forces Chief of Staff, for he had found himself between Sukarno 
and the services; his strength had rested on his continuing influence 
within the army, and if he had not acted as its spokesman he would 
soon have lost the backing he needed to maintain himself against 
Sukarno. Because of this, and because of Nasution's generally much 
weaker position, supra-military organization had remained at a minimum 
during his tenure, consisting of little more than the general staff 
offices and a series of commands and agencies linking the services for 
special projects and functions. Under Suharto, however, there has 
been a proliferation of inter-service bodies and a vast extension 
of the authority of the armed forces staff.
The 1969 reorganization followed the general trend of post­
revolutionary military consolidation in its search for centraliza­
tion and the elimination of particularistic ties. Much has been 
accomplished, especially in the matter of reducing the power of 
territorial commanders, the achievement of technical sophistication, 
and the general acceptance of central authority and bureaucratic 
procedure. At the same time, the complexity and expanded role of 
the military have created new problems of control for the army leader­
ship. The military bureaucracy has proliferated to take care of the 
diversity of the services' activities, the increasing specialization 
of their forces, and the desire of leaders to ensure dominance by 
creating countervailing forces and layers of command. Whereas once 
local commanders could act independently because the lines tying
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them to the center were few and weak, now they find a certain degree 
of autonomy because the lines of communication and command are com­
plex and tangled. At the same time, however, the expansion of the 
military role in Indonesian society which began with Guided Democracy 
and reached undisputed dominance in the New Order has given army 
members a strong sense of their corporate elite status, and with the 
fading of revolutionary memories and the reduction of Sukarnoist 
ideological ties, this has become a central source of army solidarity. 
Whether unity can be maintained in the long run in the face of the 
pressures and temptations of the army’s social role and whether the 
army can both govern and be an effective military machine are ques­
tions that the future must answer. The role of Leviathan is not an 
easy one, but the army has come very far from the weakness and con­
fusion that marked it only some fifteen years ago.

